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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
JOE HEASTON and H. R. ELLIS, a 
partnership, d/b/a Heaston Ellis 
Motor Company, 
Plaintiffs, (Respondents) 
VS. 
MANUEL MARTINEZ, 
Defendant (Appel! ant) 
JACK LAYTON and MARIAN LAY-
TON, a partnership, d/b/a Denver 
Auto Auction, 
Plaintiffs, (Respondents) 
vs. 
KAY CLARK, 
Defendant (Appellant) 
No. 8228 
No. 8238 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The written opinion of the court in this case is persuasive 
and reaches a desirable result from the standpoint of the 
Defendants and Appellants, citizens of the State of Utah. Since 
the opinion is not law until petition for rehearing has been 
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acted upon, Plaintiffs respectfully submit an analysis of the 
opinion together with their reasons for regarding the decision 
as contrary to good law and the rights of and against 
the interest of other Utah citizens and the commerce of auto-
mobiles in the State of Utah. 
The opinion proceeds upon three conclusions: 
1. That the Plaintiffs are estopped to assert their rights to 
the automobiles for which these replevin actions were instituted 
without discussing the law of estoppel. 
2. Title 41-1-65 exempts the automobiles in question from 
being registered. 
3. That Bruce, the licensed used car dealer of Utah had 
indecia of title of the automobiles involved. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ESTOPPED TO ASSERT 
THEIR RIGHTS TO THE AUTOMOBILES FOR WHICH 
THESE REPLEVIN ACTIONS WERE INSTITUTED WITH-
OUT DISCUSSING THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL. 
POINT II 
TITLE 41-1-65 EXEMPTS THE AUTOMOBILES IN 
QUESTION FROM BEING REGISTERED. 
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POINT III 
BRUCE, THE LICENSED USED CAR DEALER OF 
UTAH, HAD INDECIA OF TITLE OF THE AUTOMO-
BILES INVOLVED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ESTOPPED TO ASSERT 
THEIR RIGHTS TO THE AUTOMOBILES FOR WHICH 
THESE REPLEVIN ACTIONS WERE INSTITUTED WITH-
OUT DISCUSSING THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL. 
POINT II 
TITLE 41-1-65 EXEMPTS THE AUTOMOBILES IN 
QUESTION FROM BEING REGISTERED. 
The above two points are so interconnected in the Court's 
opinion that they are discussed here together. 
The opinion of the Court in these two cases is based upon 
the conclusion that the Plaintiffs in these actions are estopped 
to assert their rights to the two automobiles involved. In ar-
riving at that conclusion the Court decided that the Buick 
and Pontiac automobiles were not subject to the automobile 
registration statutes of the State of Utah. 
To the first proposition, the Respondent and Petitioner 
would like to call the Court's attention to the fact that the 
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Court failed to consider the facts of the cases under considera-
tion in the light of the general law and cases on estoppel. 
Estoppel is defined by American Jurisprudence, Volume 
19, Page 634, Section 34 as follows: 
· · . . . Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais is the 
principal by which a party who knows or should know 
the truth is absolutely precluded, both at law and in 
equity, from denying, or asserting the contrary of, 
any material fact which, by his words or conduct, af-
firmative or negative, intentionally or through culpable 
negligence, he has induced another, who was excusably 
ignorant of the true facts and who had a right to rely 
upon such words or conduct, to believe and act upon 
them thereby, as a consequence reasonably to be antici-
pated, changing his position in such a way that he 
would suffer injury if such denial or contrary assertion 
were allowed.'' 
The general principals and grounds of estoppel are set 
out in Page 642 at Section 42 which reads as follows: 
" ... The essential elements of an equitable estoppel 
as related to the party estopped are: ( 1) Conduct 
which amounts to a false representation or concealment 
of material facts, or at least, which is calculated to 
convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, 
inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently 
attempts to assert; (2) intention, or at least expectation, 
that such conduct shall be acted upon by the other party; 
( 3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. 
As related to the party claiming the estoppel, they are: 
( 1) Lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge 
of the truth as to the facts in question; ( 2) reliance 
upon the conduct of the party estopped; and ( 3) action 
based thereon of such a character as to change his 
position prejudicially." (Italics added.) 
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In American Jurisprudence, Section 43, it is further stated 
that the law to be as follows: 
"43. Certainty.-Estoppels must be certain to every 
intent and are not to be taken or sustained by mere 
argument or doubtful inference. No party ought to be 
precluded from making out his case according to its 
truth unless by force or some positive principle of law. 
Hence, the doctrine of estoppel in pais must be applied 
strictly and should not be enforced unless substantiated 
in every paritcular. The acts, claims, or conduct relied 
on to estop must be plainly inconsistent with the right 
afterward set up and must clearly appear to have been 
done or made by the party whom it is sought to bind. 
Where, however, the words or acts of a party are 
clearly shown, he may be concluded not only by the 
words or acts themselves, but by natural and reasonable 
inferences therefrom." (Italics added.) 
In Words and Phrases, Volume 15, Page 613-614, in a 
statement supported by a long line of cases cited thereunder, it 
is stated that the essential elements are as follows: 
" ... To constitute an estoppel, the following ele-
ments are essential: ( 1) There must be conduct, acts, 
language or silence amounting to a representation or a 
concealment of material facts. (2) These facts must 
be known to the party estopped at the time of his said 
conduct, or, at least the circumstances must be such 
that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him. 
( 3) The truth concerning these facts must be unknown 
to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel 
at the time when such conduct was done, and at the 
time when it was acted upon by him. ( 4) The conduct 
must be done with the intention, or at least, with the 
expectation, that it will be acted upon /;y the other 
party, or under such circumstances that it is both Jta!ltl'ct! 
cmd probable that it will be so acted upon. ( 5) The 
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conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and, 
thus relying, he must be led to act upon it. ( 6) He 
must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change 
his position for the worse." (Italics added.) 
In all of these text statements and the cases cited in 
support thereof, it is held that one of the essential elements to 
support an estoppel is that conduct of the party to be estopped 
must be done with the intention or at least with the expectation 
that it will be acted upon by the other party, or under such 
circumstances that it is both natural and possible that it will 
be so acted upon. With that particular element in mind, the 
Petitioner would like to review the facts in these cases and 
the law of the cases cited by the Court to support the proposi-
tion that the Plaintiffs are estopped to maintain these actions. 
The sole basis for estoppel on the part of the Plaintiffs 
as set out by the Court and as contended for by the Appellants 
is the fact that the Plaintiffs, who are wholesale automobile 
dealers out of the State of Utah, delivered possession of the 
automobiles in question to one, Bruce, a licensed Utah Used 
Car Dealer who, contrary to the agreement with the Plaintiffs, 
placed the automobiles on his lot in Salt Lake City where 
they were sold to the Defendants. 
There is no dispute as to the actual facts. The only dis-
pute is the interpretation of them in the light of the cases. 
Bruce had no bill of sale, no certificate of registration, no 
contract of sale, he had nothing but bare naked possession 
and with that possession only he placed the automobiles on 
his Used Car Lot. 
This Court has in effect, by juricial fiat, ruled that the 
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British Law of "market overt" is the law in this State without 
the benefit ofany legislative act. For a brief history of this law 
see American Jurisprudence, Volume 46, Page 625, Seeton 462. 
The reason such a holding should not be applied was 
called to the Court's attention in the Respondents' brief in 
Case No. 8238. See Williston on Sales, Sections 313, 314, 
315, 316 and 320. Also Blashfield, Volume 7, Section 4357 and 
American Jurisprudence, Volume 46, Page 620, Section 458. 
As between the parties to this litigation the doctrine of 
Caveat Emptor is more just and applicable. The Petitioner 
withheld any evidence by which the used car dealer could make 
a warranty. The Defendants at the time they dealt with the 
used car dealer could have demanded and impliedly by law 
did receive a warranty of title for their protection. However, 
the Plaintiffs did not give the seller any evidence by which he 
could honestly make such a warranty, so that the buyers failed 
in their duty to "beware" to ascertain the facts: failing to do 
so caused their damage. 
In order to determine whether the elements of estoppel 
are present in this case, it is necessary to refer back to the 
state of mind of the Plaintiffs' or their intentions at the time 
of their delivery of the automobiles in question to Bruce, and 
in reviewing the facts to make that determination we find the 
following: 
First a transaction, common m the automobile industry, 
that is the sale by a wholesaler to a dealer in the manner de-
scribed in the Stipulation of Facts set out in the original briefs 
covering these two transactions; that is the delivery of posses-
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sion of the vehicles in question and the retention of the Cer-
tificates of Title by the seller until the automobiles were paid 
for. This was done with the complete assurance on the part 
of the Plaintiffs that Bruce could not sell the automobiles and 
transfer title without the Certificate of Title. 
The question is raised why should the Plaintiffs have such 
an idea or thought. The answer might simply be that any normal 
persons knows that in the automobile world a Certificate of 
Title is necessary to acquire title to an automobile so that any 
person with common sense knew that when the purchaser 
bought an automobile from Bruce or any other dealer the 
vendor would have to deliver to the buyer a Certificate of 
Title; thus in order to do this the vendor would have to have 
a Certificate of Title. With this thought in mind, the Plaintiffs 
would naturally think that by retaining the Certificate of Title 
no one would buy the car without obtaining such a Certificate 
or in any event the dealer would not sell the automobile without 
having such a Certificate especially in view of the agreement 
between Bruce and the Plaintiffs that he would not sell or 
offer these cars for sale until he had acquired the Certificate 
of Title. 
The Plaintiffs also are charged with and we can assume 
knew and understood the following provisions of the Utah 
Code governing the registration and licensing of automobiles. 
Title 41, Chapter 1, Section 18 reads as follows: 
"41-1-18. Registration and certificates of title-Un-
lawful to violate provisions requiring.-It shall be 
unlawful for any person to drive or move or for an 
owner knowingly to permit to be driven or moved upon 
10 
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any highway any vehicle of a type required to be regis-
tered hereunder which is not registered or for which 
a certificate of title has not been issued or applied for, 
or for which the appropriate fee has not been paid 
when and as required hereunder, except that when 
application accompanied by proper fee has been made 
for registration and certificate of title for a vehicle it 
may be operated temporarily pending complete regis-
tration upon displaying a temporary permit duly veri-
fied, or other evidence of such application, or other-
wise under rules and regulations promulgated by the 
commission.'' 
The following sections governing registration of vehicles 
were also in force which the Plaintiffs could rely upon, that 
is, Sections 41-1-19, 41-1-20, 41-1-24, 41-1-31, 41-1-35 and 
41-1-40. 
The Plaintiffs also knew and were charged with and had 
a right to rely upon the following sections of the Statutes gov-
erning transfer of title or interest. Sections 41-1-64, 41-1-65, 
41-1-66, 41-1-72, and 41-1-76. 
The Plaintiffs also knew that the Statutes provided the 
following: Section 41-3-2: 
"41-3-2. Certificate of title to vendee-Every person, 
firm, or corporation upon the sale and delivery of any 
used or second hand motor vehicle shall within forty-
eight hours thereof deliver to the vendee, and endorsed 
according to law, a certificate of title, issued for said 
vehicle by the State tax commission." 
Also Section 41-3·-23, Sub-section (b): 
"41-3-23. Prohibited acts or omissions-Violation 
by licensee. It shall be unlawful and a violation of this 
11 
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act for the holder of any license issued under the terms 
and provisions hereof: 
(b) To violate any of the terms and provisions of 
this act or any of the rules and regulations promulgated 
by the administrator under the authority herein con-
ferred upon him." 
It is submitted, therefore, that with the above knowledge 
of the importance of the Registration Statutes, the Plaintiffs' in-
tentions and expectations would naturally be that the law would 
be complied with. That is the natural and reasonable conclu-
sion and if a person reaches that conclusion can it be logically 
said that the Plaintiffs' conduct was done with the intention 
or at least with the expectation that it would be acted upon 
by the other party or under such circumstances that is both 
natural and probable that it will be so acted upon as was done 
in the case before the court? In other words knowing the pro-
visions of the Statutes, knowing the common understanding 
that the Title Certificate goes with each and every auto-
mobile, a fact known by all individuals, is it natural to as-
sume that the Plaintiffs when they delivered possession of 
these automobiles to Bruce thought that persons would buy 
them without any thought as to Title or any inquiry as to 
the Title; or is it natural to assume that they thought or had 
reason to believe that Bruce would proceed to sell these cars 
without first obtaining the Certificates of Title? The answer 
to that is no. 
In order to support the conclusion of the Court in the 
present opinion it is necessary to infer, without proof, that 
Plaintiffs did not know the laws of Utah concerning registra-
tion of title, and ( 2) that it must be inferred that the Plaintiffs 
12 
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knew or had reason to believe that the used car dealer would 
engage in unlawful sale and ( 3) it must be further inferred 
that the Plaintiffs knew that the Defendants would not inquire 
as to seller's title and ( 4) it must be inferred that the Plaintiffs 
knew or should have known that the Defendants would not act 
as a prudent person. All of these inferences must be found 
against the Plaintiffs without a fact to support them before 
estoppel can be legally imposed against the Plaintiffs. 
The Court has said that Section 41-1-65 in effect nullifies 
and wipes out the recording Statutes in the case of an auto-
mobile held by a dealer for resale. This is an erroneous con-
clusion. There is no exception in any of the Sections of the 
Statutes above referred to covering an automobile purchased 
in a foreign state, and in the Utah case of Swartz vs. White, 
80 Utah 150, 13 Pac. (2d) 643, the Court did not indicate any 
exceptions when it used the following language at Page 646: 
" ... Until the secretary of state shall have issued 
such new certificate of registration and certificate of 
ownership, as herein provided in subdivision (d), 
delivay of such vehicle shall be deemed not to have 
been made and title thereto shall be deemed not to 
have passed and said intended transfer shall be deemed 
to be incomplete and not to be valid or effective for 
any purpose. The words of the statute, italicized by us, 
are clear and unambiguous and undoubtedly mecm 
what they say. Any claimed transfer from Mrs. White 
to Stewart was incomplete. Title had not passed and 
the transfer was not valid or effective for any purpose. 
Briedwell v. Henderson, 99 Or. 506, 195 P. 575; Parke 
v. Franciscus, 194 Cal. 284, 228 P. 435." (Italics add-
ed.) 
13 
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In none of the cases cited by the Court or Appellant, 
have the Courts been called upon to decide the cases in light 
of a Statute, the same as Section 41-1-72 of the Utah Statutes. 
In fact this Statute seems to be peculiar to the State of Utah. 
In light of the effect the Court gives to Section 41-1-65, 
the Petitioner would like to consider that section of the Statute 
at this time. This section of the Statute provides that the dealer 
purchasing an automobile for resale may hold the Title under 
the following conditions, holds the same for resale, and dis-
plays thereon the Registration Plates issued for such t/ehicle, 
or does not drive or permit it to be driven upon the highway. 
The only one of the above conditions present in these cases 
was that the automobiles were held for resale, the other 
requirements were not present. 
The Statute further provides that "but such transferee 
upon transfering his title or interest to another person shall 
execute and acknowledge an assignment and warranty of title 
upon the Certificate of Title and deliver the same and the 
Certificate of Registration to the person to whom such transfer 
is made," none of which was done in th cases before the Court, 
and the buyer did not ask for or in any way inquire about 
registration certificate or title certificate. 
This section does not exempt the automobile sold by a 
dealer from registration, in fact it specifically provides for 
registration. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the mere fact an automobile 
is purchased by a dealer for resale does not bring that trans-
action outside of the registration Statutes. 
14 
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The provisions of Section 41-1-72 contains its only ex-
ception: 
" . . . and said intended transfer shall be deemed 
to be incomplete and not valid or ineffective for any 
purpose except as provided in Section 41-1-77." 
Thus the transfer of an automobile through a dealer is 
incomplete and not valid or effective for any purpose until a 
new Certificate of Registration and certificate of ownership 
has been issued, and no person can become a bona fide pur-
chaser for value until that is done. 
The Court's attention is also called to the recent case of 
Mackie and Williams Food Stores, Inc., vs. the Anchor Casualty 
Company, U.S.C.A. 8th Circuit, 216 Fed. (2d) 317. The facts 
in this case are briefly as follows: The Mackie and Williams 
Food Stores are a Missouri corporation doing business in the 
State of Missouri. Mackie, furnishing the money, purchased 
at a receiver's sale at Little Rock, Arkansas a large tractor and 
semi-trailer. At the time of the sale the Arkansas Certificate 
of Title was endorsed in blank and delivered to Mackie and 
R. F. Boyd of Joplin, Missouri. The vehicles were moved to 
the lot of Patton and Boyd of Joplin, Missouri for sale, Boyd 
taking the Certificate of Title with him. No application for a 
Missouri Certificate of ownership was made by Mackie. Mackie 
and Williams later repaid Mackie the money advanced for 
the vehicles and purchased automobile comprehensive insur-
ance on them. The vehicles were destroyed by fire while the 
policies were in force. The insurer brought this action for 
declaratory judgment praying that it was not liable for the 
loss based solely on the theory that because the .Missouri 
15 
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Statutes relating to transfer of title to motor vehicles were 
not complied with, that Mackie and Williams, Inc, had no 
insurable interest. Judgment was given to the Casualty Com-
pany and it was affirmed on appeal. 
The Court in affirming the judgment after discussing the 
Statutes at Page 321 held, basing their decision upon and dis-
cussing the case of State Exrel. Conn. Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 
Conn. vs. Cox, 306, Missouri 537, 268 S.W. 87, the Circuit 
Court discussing that case said: 
"It is said that the provisions of the Missouri Motor 
Vehicle Act were essentially a police regulation of 
the highest type, in the enactment of which public 
welfare was primarily considered. It was held that the 
express terms of the Statute that the vendor attach 
his signature to the assignment on the back of the 
Certificate of Title could not be dispensed with and 
substantial compliance substituted therefor, even to 
create insurable interest. There is no escape from the 
conclusion that under the laws of Missouri, literal 
technical compliance with the requirements of the Stat-
ute is mandatory and essential to the passing and ac-
quisiton of an insurable interest." 
The Court further at Page 322 said: 
"Reverting to the argument made on behalf of 
Mackie and Williams that Paragraph 4 of Section 
301.210 does not apply because the vehicles were not 
registered under the laws of Missouri. It should be clear 
from what has been said that even if Paragraph 4 does 
not prohibit the sale in Missouri by a Missouri vendor 
to a Missouri vendee of a motor vehicde registered in 
another state, until and unless the Certificate of owner-
ship shall pass between the parties, Mackie had not 
protected his Title to the vehicles to such an extent 
16 
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that he could make valid conveyance of an insurable 
interest thereon to Mackie and Williams." (Italics 
added.) 
The Court in holding that the Plaintiffs are estopped to 
assert their title to the automobiles in question rely on 4 or 
5 cases which the Petitioner would like to analyze at this point: 
The case of L. B. Motors vs. Pritchard, Illinois case, 2 5 
N.E. (2d) 129 cited 1940. On February 2, 1937 one Hunt 
purchased an automobile from the Plaintiff, L. B. Motors and 
delivered a note due March 2, 193 7 and conditional sales con-
tract in payment of the same. On April 20, 193 7 Hunt sold 
the automobile to one, Emma Weiss, who signed a condi-
tional sales contract and promissory note payable in monthly 
installments beginning May 20, 1937. On the same day, April 
20, 1937, Hunt sold this contract to the Defendant. Thereafter 
Emma Weiss, having defaulted in making her payments, 
Pritchard took possession of the car. The conditional sales con-
tract executed by Hunt was in default and the Plaintiff de-
manded the car from Pritchard. This did not occur until 
October 20, 193 7. 
The Court in deciding the case made the following sig-
nificant statements in regard to the facts at Page 13·1: 
"The note which Hunt executed became due March 
2, 193 7 * * * Seven weeks after the note came due 
Emma Weiss * * * purchased the car * * * and in the 
following paragraph the Court says: 'She did obtain 
actual possession of the car and used it for months 
and it was not until October 20, 193 7 the appellee 
knew the appellant had claimed any title or interest 
therein. It was on that day long after Emma Weiss had 
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defaulted and after appellee had taken possession of 
the car that appellant notified appellee that it held a 
certificate of title to he automobile and demanded of 
appellee either $420.00 in interest or the automobile." 
And the Court at Page 131 says: 
"The Motor Vehicle Law and the Uniform Motor 
Vehicle Anti-theft Act both provide penalties for those 
persons who do not comply with the provisions thereof. 
These acts in our opinion were not intended as record-
ing statutes and do not in any way alter, modify or 
change the effects of the provisions of the Uniform 
Sales Act as construced by our Courts and have no 
application to the facts disclosed by this record." 
And in commenting on this the same Court in the case of 
Pageamas vs. Mixon Motor Co., 101 N.E. (2d) 1280 at Page 
281 says: 
"It is settled law in this State that the cited Statute 
is not a recording Statute and does not affect the validity 
of the sale of a motor vehicle which is otherwise valid." 
Now Illinois apparently has no provision in their Statutes or >( 
did not have any provision in their Statutes similar to Section 
41-1-72 of the Utah Code nor a section similar to Section 
41-3-2 of the Utah Code. 
Besides the lapse of time and the permitting of the car 
to be in the possession of the dealer for a period of several 
months indicating negligence on the part of the Appellant in 
that case, none of which facts were present in the cases before 
the Court, and the Illinois Court had no Statute to compare 
with Utah Statutes. 
18 
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In the case of Garrett vs. Hunter, cited by the Court, 48 
Southern (2) Section 871, Mississippi case, the Court held in 
that case that the question involved was decided in an early 
Mississippi case, Columbus Buggy Co. vs. Turley, 19 Southern 
232. 
· The Turley case involved the sale of buggies by the Colum-
bus Buggy Co. to one, J. M. Smitha, a livery stable keeper in 
Natchez, Mississippi for which he paid part cash and gave his 
note for the balance. By the terms of the Contract, Smitha 
agreed to hold said goods and the proceeds of such as were 
sold as agent for the Columbus Buggy Co. and in trust for the 
benefit of an subject to the order of the Columbus Buggy Co. 
The Court in the opinion at Page 233 says: 
"In the case before us, the vehicles were presumed 
to be sold to Smitha for resale. The course of business 
and comon observation would perhaps raise the pre-
sumption but no resort need be necessarily had to 
presumption the seller has in its contract expressly 
authorized the buyer to resell." 
The Court in conclusion says at Page 234: 
"Many States have of late years enacted Statutes 
requiring the recordation of Contracts in which Title is 
retained in the vendor, and many adjudications may be 
found under such Statutes, but the cases cited by us were 
decided independent of Statutes as it appears before 
the enactment of Statutes." 
The Mississippi Statutes regarding automobiles are greatly 
different from Utah. Mississippi has no special provisions with 
respect to Chattel Mortgages, Conditional Sales Contracts or 
the like on motor vehicles. The only provision of that State 
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is that a vehicle must be licensed annually and required to 
have a number plate displayed from the rear only. It has no 
provisions for Certificates of Title. The case of Garrett vs. 
Hunter is in effect then a horse and buggy case decided in 
a State with no recording or registration Statutes governing the 
transfer of title or sale of automobiles, and in no wise can be 
persuasive in the case at bar. 
Another case cited by the Court for its holding is AI' s 
Auto Sales vs. Moskowitz, Oklahoma 1950, 24 Pac. (2d) 588. 
The facts in that case are somewhat similar to the facts of 
the case at bar. The Plaintiffs purchased a Plymouth and the 
following day sold it to one, Charles E. Cross, a used car 
dealer of Tulsa, Oklahoma. On December 18th Cross signed 
a check or draft payable to the Plaintiffs drawn on a Tulsa 
bank in full payment. A Certificate of Title was attached to 
the draft which was dishonored on presentment, and on De-
cember 23rd or 24th, the Defendant purchased a car from 
Cross paying for the same, and a bill of sale was given to Mos-
kowitz signed by both parties. The Oklahoma case is decided 
by the Court as set out on Page 591 on the following basis: 
"Plaintiffs under the facts in this case cannot recover 
by reason of the Certificate of Title. Such Certificate 
of Title to an automobile issued under a Motor Vehicle 
Code is not a muniment of title which establishes own-
ership, but is merely intended to protect the public 
against theft and so forth." 
Again we call the Court's attention to the fact that 
Oklahoma does not have any Statutes similar or equivalent 
to Section 41-3-2 of Utah or Section 41-1-72 of Utah. That 
case, therefore, cannot be relied upon as supporting the propo-
20 
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sition that the Plaintiffs in these cases are estopped to assert 
their rights to the Buick and Pontiac automobiles. 
Another case relied upon by the Court is the case of 
Beck vs. New Bradford Acceptance Corp., reported 3 At. 
(2d) 55, a Rhode Island case 1938. In that case the Plaintiff 
brought the car from one Rickertson, a dealer on July 30, 
1935, which had been purchased from a distributor on the 
same day. The dealer gave a purchase money note and \Vas 
given the right to use the car "for storage and for display 
purposes only." The Defendant, a Finance Company, pur-
chased the Contract from the distributor. Both Defendant 
and Distributor had noticed at the time of the sale to the 
dealer that he was buying the car for resale. On May 2, 19::.·6, 
Rickertson defaulted on his note and soon thereafter the 
Defendant found the car in the possession of the Plaintiff and 
took possession. The Plaintiff brought the action to recover. 
In that case there was no discussion as to registration Statutes. 
As a matter of fact, Rhode Island does not have any registration 
Statutes or Certificates of Title provisions. They require regis-
tration for plates only, and they require no formalities to 
effect the transfer of title of an automobile, and as stated 
in the facts by the Court "they knew the car was being bought 
for resale." It is submitted, therefore, that this case cannot be 
relied upon to support the position that the Plaintiffs in the 
case before the Court are estopped to assert their rights to 
their automobiles. 
And finally the Court cites as authority for their holding 
the case of Siegel et ux vs. Bayless et al., California 248 Pac. 
(2d) 968. In that case in August, 1950 Plaintiffs, residents 
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of Michigan, turned over their 1949 Cadillac to one, Couls to 
deliver to California for the purpose of selling it. Couls was 
also given the Registration Certificate which bore the genuine 
signature of Mr. Siegel on its face. The Title Certificate was 
not delivered to Couls. Couls was authorized to sell the car for 
$3·,600.00. Any sale at a lower price was to be submitted and 
approved by the owner. A used car dealer by the name of Cole 
took possession of the car November 1st for the purpose of 
displaying it. Cole received an offer of $3100.00 from the De-
fendant, which offer was communicated to Siegel, who advised 
him that the offer was satisfactory. Cole sold the automobile 
for $2785.00 and absconded. The Plaintiff brought this action 
to recover the automobile, and judgment was given for De-
fendant. The Court in deciding this action at Page 969 says: 
" ... The basic question is whether Cole was a factor 
in this transaction. It clearly appears from the evidence 
and findings that he was. 
( 1) Section 2026, Civil Code, defines a factor as "an 
agent who, in the pursuit of an independent calling, is 
employed by another to sell property for him, and is 
vested by the latter with the possession or control of 
the property, * * * ." There can be no doubt Cole 
was employed as an agent by plaintiffs to sell their 
Cadillac. He was engaged in an independent business. 
Possession of the car was delivered to him. Thus _he 
meets all the requirements of a factor. As such he had 
"ostensible authority to deal with the property of his 
principal as his own, in transactions with persons not 
having notice of the actual ownership." Civil Code, 
sec. 2 369. Here the court has determined the purchasers 
of the automobile "had no notice of any claim of own-
ership of plaintiffs." Under these circumstances Cole 
had authority, so far as defendants were concerned, 
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to deal with the automobile as his own, for although the 
authority of a factor is by this section declared to be 
"ostensible," it is, "as to persons without notice as 
real 'as it is when it is declared to be actual.' " 12 Cal. 
Jur., Factors, sec. 7, p. 416." 
And also on Page 970 the Court in conclusion held: 
.. . . . ( 4, 5) Finally, in support of the judgment it 
should be pointed out that the conduct of plaintiffs in 
turning the car over to Cole through their agent Couls, 
and in permitting it to be and remain on Cole's used 
car lot and actually authorizing him to sell the auto-
mobile on their behalf justifies an inference of negli-
gence on their part. The Court determined the defend-
ants were not guilty of negligence in purchasing the 
car from Cole. This situation makes applicable the 
maxim that "Where one of two innocent persons must 
suffer by the act of a third, he, by whose negligence it 
happened, must be the sufferer." Civ. Code, sec. 3543. 
The loss here must therefore fall upon the plaintiffs. 
The judgment is affirmed." 
It is submitted, therefore, that the Court erred in con-
cluding that the Plaintiffs in this action were estopped to 
assert their right to the title of and right to the possession 
of the Buick and Pontiac automobiles in question here, for 
the reasons that under the law of estopple the elements neces-
sary to make that out are not present; and second, that the 
Plaintiffs had a right to rely upon the Statutes of Utah which, 
if complied with, would have prohibited Bruce from selling to 
the buyers, the Defendants. The Plaintiffs thus having the 
right to rely upon these Statutes and their compliance therewith, 
they certainly didn't knowingly or with intent, place themselves 
in a position to be estopped to later assert their interests in 
and to the automobiles in question. 
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POINT III 
BRUCE, THE LICENSED USED CAR DEALER OF 
UTAH, HAD INDECIA OF TITLE OF THE AUTOMO-
BILES INVOLVED. 
The Court in its opinion at Page 2 of the mimeographed 
copy says: 
"Although Plaintiffs gave to Bruce no written indecia 
of title, nevertheless, whereas here Plaintiffs as ex-
perienced wholesale used car distributors willingly 
turned the automobiles over to Bruce, knowing he was 
a licensed used car retail dealer, and would take the 
automobiles directly to his place of business in Salt 
Lake City for the purpose of resale, and there place 
them with the other stock, is in our opinion the granting 
of more than mere possession. Such conduct on the 
part of the original sellers, Plaintiffs we believe clothed 
Bruce with an apparent ownership or authority to sell 
said cars in the ordinary course of business . . . '' 
By this statement the Court has found that there was no 
indecia of ownership in Bruce other than being given posses-
sion by an experienced used car distributor knowing he would 
place the automobile on his lot with other stock for the pur-
pose of resale. 
The Court by this statement has overlooked or ignored 
the entire Stipulation as to the facts as set out in the record. 
The Court has said that the Plaintiffs knowingly turned 
over the automobiles to Bruce knowing he would take them 
to Salt Lake City and knowing he was a used car dealer and 
would place them with other stock fot' resale. These are not 
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the exact words used by the Court, but they are the fair pur-
port of their meaning. (Italics added.) 
The actual facts according to the Stipulation, Record of 
Appeal (R. 5-7) and as set out in the Brief of Respondents 
in Case No. 8228, are in effect considerably different. 
The conclusion of the Stipulation reads as follows: 
" . . . and said Drafts were to be honored before 
the said automobiles were o If ered for resale by the 
said M. R. Bruce." (Italics added.) 
How can it be said that the Plaintiffs knew Bruce would 
do what he did in view of the Stipulation of Facts that he 
would not do what he did? 
The only part of the Statement of the Court that stands 
in view of the Stipulation is that the Plaintiffs were experienced 
wholesale used car distributors and that they knew that Bruce 
was a licensed used car dealer and would take the automobiles 
to Salt Lake City. 
The question then arises should a different rule of law 
be applied in these cases to wholesale used car distributors 
than to other persons or organizations, and should wholesale 
used car distributors be held to a higher or different degree of 
care than any other persons? 
The answer is no. Rules of law are laid down to apply 
to all persons equally, and the mere fact that Plaintiffs were 
wholesale distributors of used automobiles does not necessarily 
give them any more knowledge of what Bruce would do 
under the circumstances than any other person would have 
known or be assumed to have known, assuming that they 
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knew Bruce was a used car dealer. It follows, therefore, that 
under the rule of law laid down by the Court under the pres-
ent opinion that any person who leaves his automobile with 
a used, or new, retail automobile dealer for any reason what-
soever, to have greased, repaired, appraised or for a dozen 
or one reasons, he would be estopped to claim his automobile 
from a so-called "innocent purchaser of the automobile from 
the dealer with whom the automobile had been left because 
under the Court's holding they knowingly left it with a li-
censed used car retail dealer. 
This is the logical conclusion to be reached from the 
Court's decision, and such a result would in effect wipe out 
the registration and licensing Statutes in a potentially large 
number of cases. To permit this decision to stand means 
that a pandora box of trouble would have been opened. This, 
the Respondents are sure, the Court has no intention and had 
no intention of doing. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, therefore, it is submitted that the Petition 
for Rehearing should be granted and the Court should re-
consider the opinoin heretofore rendered in said case on the 
grounds and for the reasons: ( 1) That no estoppel as to the 
Plaintiffs has been made out under the facts and law as 
applicable in this case. The Court's opinion in effect puts 
estoppel as a bar to Plaintiffs' action by imputing by inference 
knowledge and actions of the Plaintiffs which have no sup· 
port in fact. ( 2) That the Plaintiffs or original sellers acted 
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as careful and prudent individuals; that they complied with 
all Statutes involved; that they conducted these sales in the 
course or in the manner in accordance with the custom of the 
sale of used automobiles, and they did everything that they 
knew could be done to preserve their interest. They, there-
fore, acted as careful prudent individuals. On the contrary, 
the Defendants made no inquiries of title, did nothing to 
determine whether any title was available in the hands of 
Bruce or not; they blindly proceeded into a course of conduct 
that showed in the least a complete thoughtlessness and dis-
regard for the consequences, and to hold that the Plaintiffs 
are estopped would in effect be punishing the prudent and 
rewarding the careless individual, and ( 3) This Petition should 
be granted for the reason that to permit the same to stand 
would open the door to untold cases of fraud by weakening 
the effect of the recording Statutes of Utah and enabling 
persons by various means to perpetrate frauds upon the public 
by being able to circumvent the Registration Statutes. We, 
therefore, humbly petition the Court for a rehearing of the 
cases involved and for modification of the decision heretofore 
rendered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOWRY, KIRTON & BETTILYON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
and Petitioners 
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